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Abstract 
What is it like to be an immigrant worker in a “hostile environment” in the UK? How does the 
form of discursive environment, which produces immigration as a social epidemic, impact on 
an immigrant worker’s experiencing of their cultural (dis)localities and subjectivity? In this 
paper, I draw on my personal, psychoanalytically-informed voice to explore into these 
questions, by foregrounding the materiality of the hosting environment as the place in which 
the present relational matrix takes place, in which the internal dynamics of object relationships 
are lived in the present sense, and idiosyncratic expression of selfhood assumes forms.  
 
The materialised reality of the place matters not least because it is drenched in power relations 
but also as it is where an immigrant worker seeks dwelling. The hostile host, in this sense, not 
only produces immigrants as its guests (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000), but also as 
unwelcome yet persistent guests to be yoked to their place of otherness and inferiority. By 
presenting vignettes of my encounters with the Home Office, I call into questions the existential 
conditions of the immigrant worker and the potentiality for object-relatedness on relational 
grounds problematically punctured by hostile rhetoric. Could an immigrant’s sense of locality 
ever be anything but, evoking Said (2013[1999]), “out of place”? To address this, I will explore 
into “out of place” as not simply an emotional, lived experience, but also a state of being that 























“The worldliness of living things means that there is no subject that is not also an 
object and appears as such to somebody else” (Arendt, 1978: 19) 
 
“To be with the other is to be played by them […] as much as it is to evoke parts of 




On Searching for Emotional Truth 
What is it like to be an immigrant worker in a “hostile environment” in the UK? How does the 
form of discursive environment, which produces immigration as a social epidemic, impact on 
an immigrant worker’s experiencing of their cultural (dis)localities and subjectivity? This 
paper is an attempt to address these questions through interweaving an auto-ethnographic, 
reflexive voice with psychoanalytic theoretical considerations. The latter is particularly 
enriched by Winnicottian thinking which offers the capacious means to consider the interspace 
between the psychic processes and the lived, spatialised terrain in the social space. It aligns 
with the Bowker and Busby’s (2017) argument that a radical, nuanced re-reading of Winnicott 
lends itself to being “a rudimentary political theory of the subject” (p. 2).  At the heart of 
Winnicottian subjectivity is the creative nucleus which is capable of acting as it is acted upon. 
The ‘I’ that does not simply ‘react’ to this or that incident, but one that responds with psychical 
resourcefulness in the name of creativity to the necessity of surviving and thriving in the social 
world that one co-habits with real others. By highlighting the agentic potentiality imbued 
within the self, my hope is to steer away from the orthodox preoccupation with the failure of 
the subject as lying in its perpetual combat with dependency, narcissism and disturbances. A 
person is not a passive register whose consciousness can only be written and over-written by 
cultural beliefs and discursive forces (Frosh 1999, 2010). A person may also be prompted to 
“guard [their] otherness in order to protect the richness in living it offers” (Eigan, 1981: 418). 
It would seem morally suspicious to venerate the lived experiences of social suffering as 
something to be treasured as a gift or endured as testimony. Instead, Winnicott’s theory, so 
capable of “holding the wounded subject” (Bowker and Busby, 2017: 25), invites me to venture 
into the experiential depth of “out of place” as not simply an emotional, affective moment, but 
also a state of being that is embodied, psychically worked on, and strategically evoked in 
resisting the power of the hostile host. To demonstrate how feeling/being ‘out of place’ might 
indeed be a form of psychic mobilisation, I wish to begin with Freud and his sandstone figures. 




































































Objects Out There, In Here 
"In a specific spatial relation to myself, on my left-hand side,” Freud recounted a particular, 
unusual-looking scene from a recurrent dream, “I saw a dark space out of which there 
glimmered a number of grotesque sandstone figures." (Freud, 1909; cited in Bollas, 1992: 12) 
The significance of which remained for many years mysterious to Freud. To discover the 
meaning of a dream is a matter of chance, as Freud later saw, on a revisit to Padua after a 
twelve-year absence where he stumbled across the objects that had hauntingly reappeared in 
his dream. This chance encounter brought back vivid memories from his first visit of the place 
that “had been a disappointment”. What he had desired to see, “Giotto's frescoes in the 
Madonna dell'Arena”, had denied him entry due to closure on the day (ibid: 11). The sandstone 
figures stood on the street leading to the chapel at the specific point where he was turned back 
twelve years ago!  
Freud did not elaborate on his interpretation of this dream. What motivated his desire to see 
the frescoes? Who turned Freud away and in what manner? What had kept Freud for twelve 
years before returning to Padua?  Freud keeps us in the dark. Nevertheless, what he did reveal 
was that his failing to see, the meaning of the sandstone figures and that “dark space” behind 
them, had transformed into a “positive nuisance” (p. 11) - an acute internal unrest that partly 
triggered his revisit to Padua. Across Freud’s object world and dream life, the sandstone 
figures, lodged “in specific relation to” him, are what Winnicott termed the “subjective object” 
(Winnicott, 1969). They are projectively filled with the subject’s unthinkable thoughts and 
unbearable feelings so that they do not rest in static form but appear in animated, frightful 
appearance, sensuously haunting him both in dreaming and wakeful states.  
Limits of linearity1 sustained Freud’s on-going curiosity to keep searching. Not being able to 
see becomes what it takes to opt out of the habitual mode of seeing. It affords the transgressive 
move beyond the essentialist division between subject and object into the dimensions of mutual 
impingement between materiality (of the place, objects, closure) and subjectivity (of self-
experiencing, affect, and representation). Here, the self and the world are locked into mutual 
recreation through one another. Inner quests brought Freud to the eventual, fated even, physical 
                                                 
1
 Here we come to see how ‘doubt’ as opposed to certainty sponsors opportunities to discover the inextricable 
connections we have with things that dwell in “a network of associations full of redundancies and exuberant 





































































return to the location where the stone figures stood still. There they had remained, awaiting for 
a reunion with Freud who is now able to claim back the projective content as the true owner. 
Freud’s reflexivity released the sandstone figures from the psychic spell so they could return 
to the state of being “a thing in itself” 2 (Winnicott, 1969: 711) twelve years later. Reflexivity, 
here, in psychosocial studies, is inseparable from the ethical praxis to re-examine subjective 
meaning-making as politically implicated (Frosh, 2019). To be reflexive, is to be 
always suspicious of the knowledge we create. 
 
Impingement and The Hostile Host  
 
I first entered the land I now inhabit as an overseas student in 2012 – the year the Home Office 
announced the Hostile Environment policy, enforced by Theresa May, then the home secretary. 
Theresa May terrified me with her power to take away all the flavours from my food at the 
instance of appearance, leaving a bitter aftertaste in my mouth and indigestion in my stomach. 
Words are imbued with materialising forces and my body knows it best. Elsewhere I’ve written 
about a year that I have lived in profound fear of deportation by the Home Office that would 
have separated me from those I have relationally committed to (Fang, 2019). My presence, my 
being here for the time being signifies their continual failure to expel me. I do not intend to 
speak of it as triumph but survival of paranoid-schizoid destruction, but as time goes on, I no 
longer feel certain why I want to be part of this, am still here 3. 
 
The cultural space enacted by the hostile environment rhetoric promotes antagonism against 
those whose desires to belong are felt to be inducing sickness of surfeit for the people of the 
land. “There are millions of people in poorer countries who would love to live in Britain, and 
                                                 
2
  Winnicott’s “a thing in itself” (p. 711) is essentially a thing in its own right. In differentiating object-relating 
and object-usage, Winnicott (1969) refers to maturational process as giving rise to subject’s capacity to 
realistically experience and accept the quality of the object as being an “independent existence” (p. 712) of 
autonomy outside of the subject, of the subject’s omnipotent control. This seems to share an acute resonance 
with the new materialist’s concern of, and care for, object as independent of human subjectivity (c.f. Bennett, 
2010).  By relieving objects of its human-centred projective burden, we also “begin to experience the 
relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more 
ecological sensibility” (italics original: 10).  
 
3
 Williams (2014: 128), through presenting the reader with a historically-detailed account of Anglo-German 
diaspora, reminds us of the pendulous weight pushing and pulling a migrant in-between knowing and 




































































there is a limit to the amount of immigration any country can and should take” (Stone, 2016). 
Theresa May’s speech typifies this populist aversion to surfeit. In more extreme cases we see 
the projection of excess routinely materialised through the imagery of massive loads of 
migrants and refugees captured in movement towards the U.K border seeking dwelling; 
through the emotionally-charged articulations in conjuring a toxic fluidity of their presence, 
such as “swarm” or “flood” of migrants. The circulation and reproduction of these cultural 
products rely heavily on its ideological investments by the masses that there had been a 
balanced totality which has now been pushed towards the brink of ecological catastrophe. 
Hinshelwood’s (2005) psychoanalytic account of the (English) identity crisis through the 
global redistribution of power shows us how loss in a national sense can generate melancholic 
dynamism of clinging onto the lost object of sovereignty and grandiosity at the collective level 
(see also Henderson et al., 2017). This form of ideological investments speaks of future in the 
terms of crisis, the past in the terms of nostalgia. But an immigrant, like myself, no matter when 
we join the land, is always positioned as intruding upon the moment leading towards the crisis 
end. Irrespective of the historical time by which we arrive, like the Palestinian owner of the 
kebab shop around the corner who has been there for twenty-years, we can never be seen as a 
part of that ‘mystical past’ when everything used to be better but of a parallel reality when 
everything is always deteriorating (I will return to this). 
 
It is tempting to address the hostile environment as purely a cultural space, but my intersecting 
a personal voice with a theoretical one comes from a wish to reveal how it has solidly 
transformed into a materialised reality upon which private lives wobble. Power does the work 
here. What is “invisible”, to evoke Avery Gordan (2008), nevertheless “… can harm you 
without seeming ever to touch you.” (p. 3) Materiality matters here not least because our lived, 
everydayness is drenched in power relations of the social world but also as it concerns the issue 
of objectification of ‘things’. The hostile environment policy reflects the public appeal: the 
overall attitudes of British views “are not favourable towards immigration and a substantial 
majority would like immigration to be reduced” (The Migration Observatory, 2018). When 
asked reduction by how much, one in three (32.2%) would prefer “reduced a lot”. Furthermore, 
“British people make clear distinctions between types of migrant with the highly skilled 
preferred to the unskilled, and those from culturally close countries (such as Australia) 
preferred over those from countries perceived to be more culturally distant (such as Nigeria)” 




































































of cultural origins. Hostile environment not only reduces immigrants to categorical boxes but 
also to an object of the most essentialist form – a number to be cut down for political gain.  
 
The hostile host, in this sense, sees its immigrant guests as parasitic nuisance (Derrida & 
Dufourmantelle, 2000) to be yoked to their place of otherness and inferiority – unwelcome 
guests that are perpetually at their host’s mercy to remain or be chucked out. This can be seen 
as reflected through the harshening of the notoriously changeable immigration rules for those 
who wish to claim permanent settlement by virtue of their affiliation with the country. The 
enforcement of the Family Migration Rules in 2012 for non-European Economic Area (non-
EEA) nationals is such an example (The Migration Observatory, 2016). To claim a space as a 
family member, the duration of the time I have spent here does not matter, nor does my 
engagement to my British partner – unless he can meet the restrictive income requirement to 
be my eligible ‘sponsor’ and unless we intend to marry in six months (during which ‘the 
sponsored’ is not permitted to work and yet so much of my identity is based around being a 
professional woman!). Because of this, my political arrangement has been to remain an 
immigrant worker to be sponsored by the employer who periodically renews her permit to 
remain. By refusing to objectify love, we defy, in the Lacanian language, the imaginary of love 
as something that can be “perfectly regulated” (Frosh, 2010: 27). How does one prove love? 
Affection and intimacy can only be kept alive through bringing into our relations also the 
ordinary destructiveness and irrationalities. The testability of love concerns the performativity 
of affection. Yet, when the private matter becomes “drenched soggy in suspicious atmosphere 
framing the hostile environment” (Fang, 2019: 390), how do we  “love without destroying by 
hate” (Fairbairn, 1952: 49); particularly, the potential of hate, such as an argument or a fight, 
to arouse suspicion towards the authenticity of love. 
 
Winnicott, whose work foregrounds object-relations, draws emphatic significance on 
environment as imbued with potential for self-discovery and self-formation through the child’s 
creative interplay between, and indeed in-between, the internal and the external spaces. 
Environment, to Winnicott, is first constituted by intercorporeality with the maternal body 
(Honneth, 1995) that saturates the baby’s very awareness of the self 4. Intercorporeality is made 
                                                 
4
 This infantile ‘self’ should not be read as the self concerning the social construction of identity, but a “bodily 
ego” based on the somatic events whose awareness of the outside a mere reflection of its introjective and 
projective processing (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1974: 502)  
 




































































possible through two maternal functions: firstly, through mother’s delicate management of 
distance and proximity towards the baby; secondly, through mother’s availability to serve as 
an identificatory, affectable object into which the baby safely projects unbearable feelings and 
bodily tensions. Intercorporeality binds mother and baby together so baby’s cry of discomfort 
arouses a powerful urge in mother towards soothing the baby and so simultaneously alleviate 
the painful sensation in her own body. Drawing on Bion’s (1962) work, Eaton (2011) reminds 
us that projective identification first serves as “a form of communication” between a baby and 
her mother (p. 19). The mother’s willingness to identify with her baby’s needs, demands and 
desires is what enables her to contain her baby’s distress. Her ‘devotion’ rather than ‘cleverness’ 
(Winnicott, 1953: 94) towards her baby is what makes her a good-enough mother. 
Intercorporeality allows an illusory yet necessary experience of non-differentiation of the self 
and a nurture-giving object, necessary for its ego-strengthening function in the face of infantile 
precarity. To give voice to the infantile ego: “My need matters to you. I know this because you 
respond to it as if it was your own.” A devoted mother induces in the baby a sense of security 
and trust in preparation for their emerging awareness of the social reality as full of exciting 
newness and the threatening unknown. This allows them to “discover [their] own personal life” 
(Winnicott, 1958: 418) as a person in their own right. 
 
 On the other hand, impingement, theorised as what cuts off the baby’s experiential flow of 
coming into being, is a breach to such a maternal devotion. It breaks off the continuity of baby’s 
self-experiencing by forcing into their awareness the presence and need of the other as having 
priority to their own. It forces the baby into reactive accommodation before they are ready for 
such adaptation. In Winnicott’s words, it impels the baby to develop “a false life built on 
reactions to external stimuli” (Winnicott, 1958: 413). A psychosocial complication of the 
concept of impingement lends possibilities to exploring it also as a historically specific 
mobilisation brought into being by particular ideological investments; rhetoric can effect 
impinging forces that agitate the migratory body’s organismic coming into contact with 
external, far-from-equilibrium social conditions of any hosting land. Just as too early or too 
excessive of maternal impingement disrupts the baby’s intuitive going-on-being towards 
discovering their ‘own personal life’ (Winnicott, 1958: 418), too excessive or too relentless the 
                                                 
Perhaps you could at least acknowledge these possibilities here in this way rather than presenting these as 
universal and/or  as self evident/explanatory  generic  Winnicotian framework  which might not apply /suit for a 





































































intrusion of ideological assault amounts to an environmental failure with problematic 
consequences for the newcomers. To Winnicott (1965), no baby can thrive in constant 
experience of primitive agonies: a forced awareness of its dependence on a need-satisfying 
object. Too early should this inevitable acknowledgement comes, the initial developmental 
phase of preoccupation with the self is disrupted before they can move onto bringing the self 
into a meaningful engagement with externality. A facilitative environment is one that holds the 
baby’s well-being in the centre of attention; it grounds the baby so they remain ontologically 
orientated in weathering the affective storm brought about by the developmental tasks of 
separation, individuation and socialisation. Equally for a migratory subject, from arriving in a 
foreign land to seeking and settling in a dwelling involves multiple, non-linear trajectories of 
finding and losing aspects of self-defining articulations, negotiating relational proximities 
relating to belonging and un-belonging, and disorientating dialectics of travelling between here 
and there, present and past - all of which are affectively charged. The facilitative environment 
is no less crucial for enabling the migrant’s settling in, gaining ontological grounded-ness and 
trust for others, and finally and moving towards building social relations.  
 
Evoked within the Derridean ethos of hospitality, making space for ‘others’ concerns the ethics 
of human relations (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000); it implies decolonialising morality to 
undermine one’s sovereignty (master of the house, or owner of the breasts in mother-baby 
relation) in opening up a space that is yours as much as it is mine. For Derrida, unconditional 
hospitality can never be realistically accomplished, as a country can only take in a certain 
number of immigrants conditionally. The guest is always required to respect certain rules of 
the host. However, their right as human beings matters too. “Without this right, a new arrival 
can only be introduced ‘in my home’” (ibid: p. 59) as opposed to “into” (p. 51) my home. 
Unlike a guest, a parasite is an uninvited intruder, “illegitimate, clandestine, liable to expulsion 
or arrest” (p. 59). Hospitality is the welcoming of ‘the other’; it tasks the mother to allow the 
baby to claim her breasts as partly their own, the host their land so the migrants can call it home. 
That is, a subversion of the guest-host power relation so that co-existence within a shared space 
can be democratically negotiated. It is in this sense that hospitality generates a meeting point 
of the spatial, the relational, and the affective that is the home and the sense of being at home 
(Bulley, 2017).  
Hospitality and hostility are thereby practices of relation in which identity and 
difference, self and other, spaces of belonging and non-belonging, home and away have 





































































If there was a flickering awareness of human interdependence, it is now punctured by the rising 
anti-immigrant sentiments. The differentiation between guest and parasite is clear in theory 
(Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000). However, it becomes blurred in the UK context, where 
there is a propensity for “the language and practice of hospitality to ‘turn’ against the guest – 
the focus on the generosity of the host becomes a focus on the duties of the guest, and notably 
the construction of the figure of the guest who […] fails to fulfil his duties” (Still, 2010: 13).  
When hospitality is withdrawn, what is left is hostility. Europe is in hospitality crisis (Bulley, 
2017);  its hostility to those who seeks dwelling (immigrants, asylum seekers / refugees) 
mimics autoimmune functionality of a human body which attacks not only those targeted as 
possible threat from outside but also those already admitted on the inside with a hyperactive 
alarm against difference on nativist terms. The UK’s Hostile environment policy exemplifies 
such a territorial vigilance and excessive anti-bodies with a narrowing threshold of tolerable 
foreign bodies which remain suspicious regardless of the duration of their existence and 
positive contribution. Much akin to the borderline functioning  (Green, 1997[1986]), the hostile 
host engages in the schizoid organisation of object relations that is characterised by intense 
fluctuation of psychic states of “expansion, retraction, or both, in coping with the separation 
(loss) anxiety and intrusion (implosion) anxiety, or both” (p. 78). The pendular tension 
resulting in unsettledness and restlessness of the ego could be seen as arising from an acute, 
perpetual fear of mental breakdown through “a loss of control” (p. 78). With this in mind, we 
can perhaps see how the right-wing rhetoric of taking back control served as a successful 
discursive strategy during the Brexit campaign. The borderline state signifies ego fragility, 
propelling unending attempts to define and secure its ego-boundary by means of fortifying a 
rigid crossing-line (hence the term ‘border-line’) in defence against the perceived perpetual 
threat of intrusion and implosion. This seems well captured by the Home Office in relation to 
its immigrant guests that it extends on the one hand, “an economically driven, heavily 
conditional and largely ineffective welcome; and, on the other, “a security driven, disciplinary 
and militarised hostility” (Bulley, 2017: 15).  
The rigid splitting of the bad and the good objects, what Otto Kernberg (1967) sees as pivotal 
in the borderline organisation, leads to a hyper preoccupation with its psychic frontier of what 
to let in and expel. Preferring the term organisation to disorder, Kernberg presents us with a 
compelling portrayal of the inner reality organised to the purpose of protecting the individual 




































































bad introjections. (p. 666) The organisation in operation here concerns preservation of self-
identity. Ambiguity can hardly be tolerated not only as good and bad are perceived as polarised 
forces. But as totalisation of objects into all-good and all-bad promises time and again a sense 
of supreme sovereignty enabled by one’s total identification with the all-good objects over the 
unruly counterpart (Wieland, 2017). Let’s “sweep them all away”5 (Sparrow, 2014). All but 
not some. The language used here signifies an unmistakably totalitarian conviction of certainty. 
We might find it hard to disagree with Andre Green (1997[1986]) who dubs Winnicott “the 
analyst of the borderline” (p. 68). The conceptual shift from the internal-external dialectic to 
the interplay between the two by Winnicott brings analytic attention to one’s capacity, or 
indeed inability, to create and make use of this intermediate space. Winnicott shows us how, 
in the state of borderline organisation, patients cannot move into the intermediate space as the 
experiential playfield. Ronald Britton refers to this as the problematical phenomenon of hyper-
subjectivity (Britton, 2004): the overmuch adherence to one’s subjective experience seemingly 
makes it impossible for the subject to suspend one’s conviction of certainty and enter into the 
intersubjective “to-and-fro of the interaction to know what was going on” (p. 48). In other 
words, what is felt can only be registered as real. The subjective object is the objective object 
– the sandstone figures are out there to get Freud! Absence of the intermediate space affronts 
the subject with an overflowing sense of threat of intrusion that is perceived to be hovering 
near one’s doorstep and so one feels to be in constant danger. 
Being a Subject-Object  
We seek dwelling for its generative dimensions within which intersubjective matrix of 
relational life takes place and unfolds. Relationality exposes the “fragile and necessary 
dimension of our interdependence” (Butler, 2012: 148) by exposing the hierarchically 
imbalanced ontological precarity. Whilst all humans share a dimension of existential precarity 
preceding self-reflexive acts, states of ontological precarity is acutely collapsing into the bodies 
of socially oppressed groups. Anti-immigration mobilisation succeeds by activating a 
heightened level of sympathetic sentiments on the living conditions of the deprived social-
economical groups that tend to be tucked under the blanket identifier of “white working class” 
                                                 
5
 The quote is from Neil Hamilton attacking the “the deracinated political elite of parasites, the bureaucrats, the 
Eurocrats, the quangocrats, the expenses-fiddlers, the assorted chancers, living it up at taxpayers' expense”. The 
masses here are portrayed as the good, innocent tax-payers who has fallen victims to exploitation by the bad, 




































































(Bhambra, 2017), whilst little concern is shown to the absence of public solidarity towards the 
racially and ethnically marginalised who are forever the target in anti-immigration campaign. 
To this she contends,  
… the racial and ethnic minorities in the UK and the US were not only recent 
immigrants, but also long‐ standing citizens, and many of them also exist in similarly 
precarious positions. Why was their precarity […] not of concern within the debates? 
(p. 217) 
 
The ontological precarity is exposed through the disparity of public concerns in the face of 
dissociative marginalization of the needs of the immigratory communities by its majority 
counterpart. The acquisition of the status of citizenship, as Bhambra (2017) disillusions, does 
not make hazy the immigratory traces which a migrant body has heavily dragged behind it. 
Irrespective of the duration of settlement, an immigrant is perceived as always intruding upon 
the land whose recurring sense of exclusion constitutes an undying reminder that – “you are 
not perceived as belonging to the history of the nation, your concerns ought not to matter in 
the politics of the present.” (p. 220) If acquiring the status of citizenship does not readily trigger 
social inclusion or rectify the systematic exclusion from political discourse, what then could 
be missing which bars one’s being recognised as belonging to “the history of the nation” that 
Bhambra speaks of?  
 
Hannah Arendt (1978) might help us think on this further. Reversing the conventional 
philosophical primacy given to interiority concerning self-knowledge and truth, Arendt 
redirects attention on exteriority concerning appearance and superficiality. The metaphysical 
dichotomy between being and appearing is one to be critically questioned for the sake of 
coming in touch with what appears right in front of us, in the richness of display of things. 
Being a subject invariably coincides with one’s also being an object, the ontological plurality 
that a perceiver is also the perceived. To appear, in her own words, “always means to seem to 
others, and this seeming varies according to the standpoint and the perspective of the spectators.” 
(ibid: 21) Each of us a subject-object, as the term I will now use, every self-display by virtue 
of its “appearingness” (Arendt (1978: 2) exposes us to the social examination of our 
authenticity. The qualifier of authenticity is highly arbitrary; posed as a question, it comes 
down to the spectator’s judgement which is “immediate, non-mediated by any thought or 




































































interrelation that gives rise to complex subjectivity. It mechanistically filters through how one 
appears as an object and its potential affective evocation. Arendt simplifies the formula of 
judgement here from the view of the spectator – “The point of the matter is: I am directly 
affected. For this very reason, there can be no dispute about right or wrong here.” (p. 265; 
emphasis added] The absence of deliberational process speaks to the core of the spectator’s 
reductionistic filtering through the abstraction of sameness and otherness in the midst of 
appearances. What pleases is a matter of the object being gratifying to the senses when others 
less so. This differentiation of the inauthentic bodies from the authentic ones by the value of 
the surface reflects the lack of intermediate space so subjective feelings are taken as the 
ultimate truth. Citizenship therefore does not qualify the subject on the ground of authenticity, 
for the subject remains the same object being perceived, and, to that end, one is perceived just 
as the same as other foreigners. The matter of authenticity calls to mind richly detailed auto-
biographical revelations of “out of place” by Edward Said (2013[1999]). In one account, Said 
illustrated how the imagery of his name, the English-appearing ‘Edward’ glued to the Arabic-
sounding ‘Said’ perpetually betrays his sense of authenticity (Said, (2013[1999]), and how it 
marks an inexhaustible source of his feeling out of place. 
 
When one’s sense of authenticity as a subject becomes troubled by other’s suspicion of its 
inauthenticity as an object, how can one be anywhere but out of place? It is to this question that 
I now turn, hoping to complicate the articulation of ‘out of place’ through my own 
psychoanalytic reflections as a subject, as any other subjects, who is responsive to the cultural 
systems in which one’s subjectivity is engaged. 
 
‘Out of Place’ as a Defence Against the Hostile Host 
 
As an immigrant worker, the “primitive agonies” (Winnicott, 1965) of my dependence on the 
Home Office and the possibilities of being rejected have never eluded my consciousness. I 
have been hypersensitive to tales of people who I know and of journalistic reports, such as 
those from The Guardian, who published gruesome accounts of immigrants being deported, or 
kept in detention centres as the result of their visa applications being rejected. Like many, I 
have also been profoundly demoralised by the Windrush scandal, stunned to see how 
disposable their bodies were on the land where they had resided for decades by the State power. 
My sense of entitlement to my life “as lived here, in the spatio-temporal horizon established 




































































should I fail to comply with one thing or another, then I put my permit at the risk of being 
revoked. My fear of not being a good-enough baby is not of paranoiac nature but grounded in 
a realistic concern about our shared fates at the mercy of a rejecting mother. There have only 
been too many examples of how people have committed to no wrong and yet received a 
deportation notice, only to find out later through juridical investigations that there had been a 
mistake in the Home Office’s system6. I dread to check my inbox, dreading to have the 
mother’s gaze upon me and meet its gaze – to see my face full of fears reflected back through 
her triumphant smug smile full of hostility. For now, I keep my racialised head down 
continuing to survive relentless ideological attacks which produce immigration as social 
epidemic amid the roughness and callousness of the hostile rhetoric that wills me to take it 
personally. 
 
In the face of an uncaring mother, dependency is risky (Winnicott (1968: 240). The range of 
primitive psychic defence becomes developed and acutely deployed at the infantile stage 
precisely because without the psychic manoeuvring against its growing awareness of the severe 
reality, “there would be a breakdown of mental organisation” (1971: 86). Winnicott draws on 
the child’s creative mobilisation of the schizophrenic states as what provide the child with a 
defensive protection against reality, which has been perceived as unliveable and unreliable, 
through their imaginative creation of multiple more worlds hence help the child to attain 
“a position of invulnerability”. (p. 87) Similarly, the hostile environment is created to 
constitute a certain unliveable reality for those whose inauthentic bodies are marked either with 
illegality or potential for illegality. For those bodies, the multiple vulnerabilities experienced 
with unbearable intensity call for improvisational, creative deployment of psychic defence 
through which the hostile reality can be mediated into one that is as much bearable as it can be. 
If my previous account of ‘out of place’ has presented it as an affective response to hostile 
environment (Fang, 2019) I now wish to contend that ‘out of place’ can also be one of many 
potential defensive negotiations in relation to the realistically-perceived environmental failure. 
To illustrate this, we shall return to Freud’s sandstone figures.  
 
Early on, readers were introduced to Freud and his sandstone figures. I drew attention to how 
little clues we were given by Freud as to what had actually happened on the day. I believe, 
                                                 
6
 See Amelia Hill’s (2018) report - “At least 1,000 highly skilled migrants wrongly face deportation, experts 
reveal”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/06/at-least-1000-highly-skilled-




































































nonetheless, that there is much to gain if we retell this story through attending to the ontological 
position of the sandstone figures. As an object, it stays true to its non-human, non-organic form 
of existence, standsing still allowing themselves to contain Freud’s intense, affective projection 
evoked by disappointment on being turned down and away from what he desired to see. As an 
object, it readily foregoes autonomy as a thing in its own right to identify with Freud’s 
projective content so they become an extension to Freud’s subjectivity, taking in and safe-
keeping what the subject seeks to leave behind but could never successfully do so. What haunts 
Freud, as we now see, is not the sandstone figures, but Freud’s very own unwanted memory 
disguised in grotesque appearance of the object. What keeps coming back, the recurrence of 
their haunting image, is what begs the subject to attend to their own unprocessed, unsymbolised 
mental contents.  
 
“To be with the other”, states Bollas (1992), “is to be played by them” (p. 28). This playing, in 
the intersubjective sense, relies on the dynamic unfolding through projective identification and 
through one’s simultaneous being engaged as an object who is also a subject. This playing, at 
its best, is to “evoke parts of [him or herself] by virtue of the actions of our own character” 
(Bollas, 1992: 28) In other words, by virtue of our being real. To be with others is to partially 
if not wholly yield to the political conditions in which the dynamic unfolding of one’s coming 
into relation with others is grievously hampered by the collective actions of nationalist 
character. The cultural practices of routine objectification of the immigrant subject, as conjured 
by its disposability, is created so that the disappointment experienced at a national level and 
the sequential castration of its sense of power beyond endurance can be projected into the object 
of the immigrant bodies – by appearance that are not only foreign but redeemably bad hence 
blameworthy. What is good, therefore, must be seen as uncontaminatedly good. 
 
But the subject-object, despite its being treated as an object, is never devoid of awareness of 
its own capacity to affect and be affected. To be force-fed with what does not feel to fit one’s 
character is sickness-inducing beyond endurance. The projection may have been forceful, but 
one with which I, as a subject, struggle to identify. My political agency as someone who not 
only responds but also acts as a subject-object manifests as an ongoing endeavour to resist 
being pinned down to one’s place – a place of single locus of identificatory submission that 
Freud’s sandstone figures were able to tolerate as a subjective-object. It would then seem that, 
perhaps, being out of place can be seen as a refusal to play one’s part in the mutual process of 




































































wiggling out of one’s place that has been pre-defined against the will of the subject.  Out of 
place, in other words, as a perpetual hesitation to be part of what feels to be at odds with one’s 
subjectivity, allows the subject to de-objectify itself – to reassure its humanness as someone 
who feels and acts rather than something which receives and contains in a static rigidity. Out 
of place, understood this way, may be seen as imbued with political initiative to defy unethical 
identification with the oppressor or the homogenously-constructed oppressed. A perpetual 
preoccupation with one’s “neither-nor-ness” against being owned by either that fails to capture 
its beauty of complexity. 
 
Referring to his work with six years old child, Bob, Winnicott was specific in naming the 
traumatic consequences of environmental failure in the order of 
“disintegration, disorientation, depersonalisation, falling for ever, and loss of sense of real and 
of the capacity for relating to objects” (1971: 87). It is beyond the scope of my investigation to 
elaborate more fully upon the developmental sequence of such in the problematic context of 
settling down as a newly arrived immigrant. I believe that what Winnicott has named here is 
of great use for my argument that disorientation should indeed be placed before 
depersonalisation. Whilst I am unwilling to equate disorientation with the defence of out of 
place, as the latter in my argument amplifies the agentic potential of the subject, it chimes with 
my concern that to identify with, and therefore take in, the other’s projective contents of 
irredeemable badness requires nothing but a complete depersonalisation – a psychic killing of 
the subject’s subjectivity so the subject is now, only and purely an object. An unreflexive 
container obstructed from coming into meaningful relation with the surrounding world. 
Winnicott (1969), who once said “something of the subject is found in the object, though 
enriched by feeling” (p. 712), sees psychoanalytic progress as lying in the self’s growing 
reflexivity and capacity to own the projective content once lodged in the Other. At the end of 
his work with Bob, he observed that, “I was emerging (for him) out of the category of subjective 
object, or dream come true.” (1971: 88). Insight emerged for Freud when the recurrent dream 
of sandstone figures became undone by the dreamer’s encounter with the objects where they 
stood as they were. We - immigrants as lodged in specific relation to its ‘native’ counterpart - 
too wait, for the day when we can emerge out of the category of subjective object – to become 
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